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I. INTRODUCTION
The law is for the protection of the weak more than the strong.1
Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.2
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio focuses a great deal of attention
on Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation statute.3 On June 27, 2001, the
Supreme Court of Ohio issued a split decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage
Company,4 which declared Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931 unconstitutional in
its present form. Under Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931, statutory subrogees5
were granted extremely broad rights to recover amounts of compensation and
benefits paid to a claimant when that claimant was injured as a result of third-party
negligence.6 The statutory subrogee was given the automatic right to recover from
any settlement or judgment that the injured employee received from the third-party
tortfeasor to satisfy the amount of compensation and benefits paid out in a particular
claim.7
The majority in Holeton criticized the specific provision in § 4123.931(A) that
allowed a statutory subrogee to recover an amount equal to the estimated future
1

Sir William Erle, English Jurist; Chief Justice, (1850).

2

Edmund Burke, (1780).

3

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931 (Anderson 2001).

4

Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001).

5

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93(B) (Anderson 2001) (“‘statutory subrogee’ means
the administrator of the Bureau of Workers Compensation, a self-insuring employer, or an
employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services pursuant to division (L) of
section 4121.44 of the Revised Code.”)
6

PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 14.25 (2d ed. 1998).

7

Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, LPA, Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute
Ruled Unconstitutional, Volume 12, Issue 4, OHIO EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (August 2001)
at 4 [hereinafter Denlinger] (stating that the statutory subrogees “were entitled to receive an
amount equal to past payments of compensation and medical benefits as well as estimated
future compensation and medical costs.”) Id.
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workers’ compensation costs.8 Thus, the court held that this provision in section
4123.931 amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the employee’s property and a
violation of due process.9 Additionally, the majority criticized section 4123.931’s
differing treatment of settlements and judgments after trial.10 The court decided that
this differing treatment amounted to an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due
process, and a denial of equal protection rights by distinguishing between injured
workers who actually try their tort claims and those who settle their tort claims out of
court.11 As a result of the Holeton decision, subrogation rights in Ohio are
surrounded by confusion, uncertainty, and disagreement.
This Note begins by examining the complex history behind workers’
compensation subrogation rights in the state of Ohio. This historical timeline flows
from the period when statutory subrogation was non-existent in Ohio, to the first
version of a subrogation statute in 1993, and finally to the broadened and revised
statute in 1995. A detailed examination of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company follows the historical overview and focuses on
the unconstitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931. Additionally, the
popular competing views gleaned from both the dissent in Holeton and the Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation’s Motion for Reconsideration are discussed to demonstrate
the wide scope of disagreement this decision has created in Ohio. In portraying both
sides of the various subrogation arguments, this note asserts that the decision reached
in Holeton was correct.
Having set the stage, the discussion turns to the various controversies the Holeton
decision has generated in Ohio and those it will generate in the future. This
discussion focuses on whether the temporary revival of the 1993 subrogation
statute12 is an appropriate course of action. Additionally, the possible refund of all
subrogation payments received by the Bureau as a result of the improper and
unconstitutional application of the 1995 statute is also discussed. Finally, this Note
provides insight as to what the General Assembly should consider while drafting a
new subrogation statute. This Note asserts that the 1993 statute should not be
considered revived, and that the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation should be
enjoined from asserting any subrogation rights under the 1995 statute. Therefore, the
refund of all subrogation payments unconstitutionally received by the Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation through section 4123.931 is warranted.
This Note concludes that once the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has repaid
that which it has improperly and unconstitutionally taken from injured employees in
the state of Ohio, the General Assembly should pass a new statute that achieves the
statutory purpose of subrogation, is fair to the injured employee, and reflects on the
employee’s constitutional rights.
8

Id.

9

Id. See also Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1125 (holding that Ohio Revised Code § 4123.931
violated Article I, sections 16 and 19 of the Ohio Constitution).
10

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

11

Id. See also Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1127 (holding that Ohio Revised Code § 4123.931
violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution).
12

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (repealed 1995) (reenacted as a definitional statute in
House Bill 278).
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II. THE HISTORY OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SUBROGATION IN OHIO
The state of Ohio has never had the benefit of a strong workers’ compensation
subrogation statute that conferred legitimate subrogation rights. Before 1993, there
were no workers’ compensation subrogation rights under Ohio statutory law.13 In
1993, the General Assembly made its first attempt at a subrogation statute, which
resulted in extremely limited enforcement success.14 In response, the General
Assembly adopted a revised 1995 subrogation statute.15 This statute has been
operating unconstitutionally since its inception.16 Presently, the state of Ohio is
refusing to refund the millions of dollars wrongfully taken from the injured workers
of Ohio under the 1995 unconstitutional statute.
A. The Early History of Subrogation in Ohio
A basic right of subrogation involves “the substitution of one person in place of
another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right.”17 A right of subrogation
in the workers’ compensation context was created to prevent an employee from
receiving a double recovery: recovery from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
and from the third-party tortfeasor.18 Initially, however, there was no statutory
provision regarding subrogation in Ohio law that allowed the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation [hereinafter the Bureau] or a self-insured employer to recover the
compensation and benefits paid to an employee when that employee was injured by a
third-party.19 This is apparent in Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbell Cliffs Furnace Co.,20
which held that an employer could not recover any sum to reimburse any amount
paid in workers’ compensation benefits, regardless of whether their employee’s
injury resulted from the negligence of a third party.21
Due to the absence of an Ohio statute that would effectively subrogate the
employer to the employee’s claim against the third party regarding workers’
compensation benefits received by the employee, early court decisions formulated
exceptions to the harsh rule enumerated in Truscon.22 For example, in 1949, in
13

See infra text accompanying note 19.

14

See infra text accompanying notes 34, 35.

15

See infra text accompanying notes 40, 41.

16

See infra text accompanying note 60.

17

FULTON, supra note 6.

18

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4 (“The most common subrogation claims involve motor
vehicle accidents, but they may also involve product liability claims, animal bites, medical
malpractice, or any other situation in which an employee receives workers’ compensation
benefits because of injuries caused by a third party.”).
19

W. Craig Bashein & Paul W. Flowers, Assessing the Impact of Holeton, at 3 (Aug. 9,
2001) (unpublished) (citing Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbell Cliffs Furnace Co., 166 N.E. 368
(Ohio 1929)).
20

166 N.E. 368 (Ohio 1929).

21

Id. at 398-99.

22

See Bashein, supra note 19, at 4 (citing Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 461 N.E.2d 1299
(Ohio 1984)).
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Midvale Coal Company v. Cardox Corporation,23 the court held that when the third
party tortfeasor’s negligence breached an agreement with the employer, the employer
was permitted to recover compensation and benefits paid from the actual wrongdoer
through a cause of action that was separate and distinct from the employee’s tort
claim.24 The injured employee was still permitted a double recovery from both the
Bureau and the third-party tortfeasor, regardless of the employer’s separate
recovery.25
This exception to the rule lasted until 1963, when the Midvale decision was
overruled by Fischer Construction Company v. Stroud,26 which reaffirmed Truscon
and held that no subrogation rights existed, and there were no tolerated exceptions.27
Subrogation rights, or the lack thereof, existed in this manner until 1984, when the
court in Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp.,28 reinstated the Midvale decision.29 The
Midvale standard regarding subrogation rights in Ohio remained until 1993, when
the General Assembly made its first attempt at creating a statutory right of
subrogation.
B. The 1993 Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute
Effective October 20, 1993, the Bureau and self-insured employers obtained
limited subrogation rights, when the Ohio General Assembly adopted House Bill
107.30 House Bill 107 enacted Ohio Revised Code section 4123.93,31 which
provided “a right of subrogation in favor of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
and self-insuring employers for amounts of compensation and benefits paid in
connection with workers’ compensation claims which result from third-party
negligence.”32 Money collected under this new subrogation statute directly benefited
self-insured employers, whereas money collected by the Bureau benefited the state
fund, thereby, lowering the premium rates for the employer.33
The statute, however, only created a right of subrogation for some types of
recoveries obtained by injured employees. 34 Due to the statute’s poor drafting and
23

89 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1949).

24

Id. at 451.

25

Id.

26

175 Oho St. 31 (Ohio 1963).

27

Id. at 34.

28

461 N.E.2d 1299 (Ohio 1984).

29
See Bashein, supra note 19, at 5 (citing Ledex, Inc.). According to Bashein and Flowers,
“[a]s a result [of the Ledex decision], the only recovery available to an employer whose
employee was injured by a third party was a claim for the increased workers’ compensation
premiums suffered as a result.” Bashein, supra note 19, at 4.
30

See Bashein, supra note 19, at 4.

31

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (repealed 1995) (reenacted as a definitional statute in
House Bill 278).
32

FULTON, supra note 6.

33

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

34

Bashein, supra note 19, at 6.
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limited enforcement success, the statute was ineffective in the collection of
subrogation funds.35 For example, Ohio courts decided that the 1993 subrogation
statute did not apply to out of court settlements,36 to recoveries received from the
injured employee’s own motorist insurance policy,37 to wrongful death actions,38 and
to the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and court costs that exceeded the
workers’ compensation benefits paid.39
Due to the 1993 statute’s poor drafting and extremely limited success, the
Bureau’s law department assisted the Ohio General Assembly in drafting a new
subrogation statute that would give the Bureau and self-insured employers stronger
and broader subrogation rights.40
C. The 1995 Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute
Effective September 29, 1995, as part of House Bill 278, the Ohio Legislature
repealed and reenacted Ohio Revised Code section 4123.93 as a definitional statute,
and renumbered the revised subrogation statute as section 4123.931.41 The newly
revised statute created a right of subrogation to benefit a statutory subrogee, defined
as “the administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, a self-insuring
employer, or an employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services
through approved health care program.”42 The statutory subrogees were given the
automatic right to recover any settlement or judgment that the injured claimant was
able to receive from the negligent third party, in virtually any type of situation
imaginable, regardless of whether litigation was filed in court.43 Additionally, they
were entitled to receive an amount equal to “past payments of compensation and
medical benefits and estimated future values of compensation and medical
benefits.”44
The other major controversial provision of the 1995 statute was that the entire
amount of any settlement or compromise received by an injured employee was
subject to the subrogation rights of a statutory subrogee, regardless of how the

35

Id.

36

Id. (citing Gregory v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 686 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio
1996)).
37

Id. (citing Schultz v. Yellow Freight Syst., No. 96APE03-382, 1996 WL 729867 (Ohio
Ct. App. 10th Dist. Dec. 17, 1996)).
38

Id. (citing Sallach v. United Airlines, Inc., 698 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1997)).

39

Bashein, supra note 19, at 7 (citing State v. Swanger, No. 9-99-14, 1999 WL 692464
(Ohio Ct. App. 3rd Dist. Aug. 3, 1999)).
40

FULTON, supra note 6.

41
Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 2. (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished).
42

FULTON, supra note 6 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (B)).

43

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931(A) (Anderson
2001).
44

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931(A) (Anderson 2001).
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settlement was characterized.45 In addition, any designation of funds to avoid this
specific section was void, unless special jury interrogatories were used to designate
the different types of damages.46
Subrogation under the new section 4123.931 worked fairly well for the Bureau
and employers alike from 1995 through 2001. In many instances, however, the
broad scope of the statute did not work to the benefit of the injured worker.47 This
broad and lopsided effect of section 4123.931 prompted numerous attacks on the
statute’s constitutionality under Ohio law48 that paved the way for an injured
employee, his attorneys, and the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers to challenge
Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation statute as unconstitutional in Holeton v.
Crouse Cartage Company.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION IN HOLETON V. CROUSE
CARTAGE COMPANY
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company
was a critical first step in correcting the unjust impact that the 1995 subrogation
statute had on the injured workers of Ohio. Holeton has effectively paved the way
for strong arguments in favor of refunding the millions of dollars that were
impermissibly taken under the unconstitutional statute. Therefore, injured workers
who have been forced to pay exorbitant amounts of money to the state under the
1995 subrogation statute may now have some legitimate relief in sight.
Contained in this section is a brief discussion of the pertinent facts behind Holton
v. Crouse Cargtage Company, and a detailed explanation of the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s decision in the matter. In ruling Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation
statute unconstitutional, the court began by noting that the concept of subrogation
was valid.49 However, the court found that parts of sections 4123.931(A) and
4123.931(D) of the statute directly interfered with a claimant’s constitutional
rights.50 The majority’s decision as to the unconstitutionality of the subrogation
statute is discussed below.
A. The Facts in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company
On June 18, 1998, plaintiff Rick Holeton was injured in the course and scope of
his employment with Harper Structures.51 At the time of his accident, Mr. Holeton
worked as part of a construction crew in the process of building an overpass across
the Ohio Turnpike.52 A truck, owned and operated by defendants James Parr and
45

FULTON, supra note 6.

46

Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (D)). This provision of section 4123.931
thereby differentiated between a claimant who takes his or her claim to court, and a claimant
who decides to settle out of court.
47

Bashein, supra note 19, at 5-7.

48

Id.

49

See infra text accompanying notes 62, 63.

50

See infra text accompanying notes 67, 73.

51

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1113.

52

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002

7

80

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:73

Crouse Cartage Company, struck the telescoping man-lift bucket in which Mr.
Holeton was standing.53 The force of the impact propelled Mr. Holeton out of the
bucket, thrusting him into the underside of the overpass and then dropping him onto
the highway below, leaving him seriously injured.54
Since Mr. Holeton’s injuries occurred in the course and scope of his employment
with Harper Structures, he received and may indefinitely continue to receive,
workers’ compensation benefits from the Bureau.55 At the time of this decision, Mr.
Holeton received over $190,000 in wage and medical benefits from the Bureau.56
Mr. Holeton sued Crouse Cartage Company for his personal injuries, and the
Bureau asserted a subrogation claim against any settlement or judgment Mr. Holeton
might receive by or on behalf of the defendants, pursuant to Ohio’s workers’
compensation subrogation statute, Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931.57 Plaintiffs
Rick Holeton, his spouse Shari Holeton, and his two minor children disputed the
validity of the Bureau’s subrogation claim and argued that the subrogation statute
violated relevant sections of Ohio’s Constitution.58 The majority opinion by Justice
Alice Robie Resnick resolved the court’s eight-part inquiry into the statute’s
constitutional and legal validity.59 The court held that “the law violates a
constitutional provision against the government’s taking of private property without
just compensation and runs counter to constitutional guarantees of remedy for an
injury by due course of the law and equal protection.”60
B. Attacking the Concept of Subrogation
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately decided that Ohio’s subrogation
statute was unconstitutional, the court began its discussion by rejecting two specific
arguments made by the Plaintiff, discussed below.61 By addressing these arguments
first, the court effectively laid the foundation for their future support of a
constitutionally sound subrogation statute. Additionally, by first rejecting these
broad and overarching assertions, the court enabled itself to move into a more
specified look at the subrogation statute.
First, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Mr. Holeton’s assertion that a
subrogation statute is inherently unconstitutional on its face, by noting that virtually
every state has some type of subrogation statute enabling a state fund or an employer

53

Id. at 1114.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1114.

57

Id.

58
Id. The Bureau, in response, denied that the subrogation statute was unconstitutional and
sought to enforce its subrogation rights under section 4123.931.
59

Communications Office of Ohio Supreme Court, Supreme Court Strikes Workers’
Compensation Subrogation Statute (June 27, 2001).
60

Id.

61

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1117.
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to recover paid benefits and compensation.62 To support this position, Justice
Resnick stated that “[a]ny decision that would hold the mere concept of subrogation
or reimbursement per se invalid in the workers’ compensation context would
constitute a legal anomaly.”63
Second, the court noted that Ohio’s subrogation statute does not operate to reduce
an injured employee’s workers’ compensation benefits in any way.64 Justice Resnick
stated that even though the statute may diminish or extinguish a claimant’s tort
recovery irrespective of whether a double recovery had occurred, the statute does
nothing to the claimant’s workers’ compensation recovery; “the claimant is always
left with the full measure of compensation and benefits to which he or she is entitled
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”65 Although these assertions were rejected,
the Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately decided that Ohio’s subrogation statute was
unconstitutional, as it specifically violated Article I, sections 2, 16, and 19 of the
Ohio Constitution.66
C. Estimated Future Values of Compensation and Medical Benefits
The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Ohio’s workers’ compensation
subrogation statute impermissibly gave the statutory subrogee a claim to recover
estimated future values of compensation and medical benefits under section
4123.931(A), and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 67 Justice Resnick stated:
By giving the subrogee a current collectible interest in estimated future
expenditures, R.C. 4123.931(A) creates conditions under which a
prohibited taking may occur. This would happen in those situations
where the amount of reimbursement for “estimated future values of
compensation and medical benefits” proves to be substantially greater
than the subrogee’s eventual compensation outlay.68
For example, a claimant may die before collecting the entire expected and estimated
amount of compensation, and therefore, the subrogee would receive money never
actually paid to the claimant.69
Additionally, in discussing wrongful death situations, the court illustrated another
prime example of when the amount of reimbursement for estimated future values
proves to be greater than the subrogee’s eventual compensation outlay:

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129.

67

Id. at 1119.

68

Id. In other words, O.R.C. 4123.931(A) requires the claimant to reimburse the Bureau
for future benefits that the claimant may never receive.
69

Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, Subrogation Unconstitutional, LEGAL NEWS (July 2001)
available at http://www.calfee.com/news.
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[I]n a wrongful death situation where the decedent leaves a surviving
spouse—say, a woman in her thirties or forties . . . the BWC or selfinsured employer will calculate estimated future benefits based upon the
. . . woman’s life expectancy. However, if the woman remarries, she will
cease to be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits upon remarriage
. . . in those circumstances, if the subrogee has recovered estimated future
benefits based upon the woman’s life expectancy, and she remarries
shortly thereafter, the statute endows the subrogee with an enormous
windfall at the expense of the injured party.70
The majority stated that in these types of events, which occur all too often, the
subrogation statute does not operate to prevent the claimant from receiving a double
recovery, but instead provides the statutory subrogee with monies that the claimant
never actually received, thus frequently resulting in a windfall.71 The court
considered this potential windfall for the statutory subrogee at the expense of the
claimant tantamount to an unlawful taking of the claimant’s property, which violates
Article I, sections 16 and 19 of the Ohio Constitution.72
D. Distinguishing Between Settlements and Judgments
Additionally, the court found that Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation
statute impermissibly establishes a procedural framework that distinguishes between
third-party claims that are tried in court and third-party claims that are settled under
section 4123.931(D).73 Simply speaking, workers’ compensation benefits cover only
certain types of injuries to the specific claimant.74 It does not cover any additional
damages that may surround the claimant’s accident (i.e., pain and suffering).75
Under section 4123.931(D), if a claimant decided to try his or her case against a
third-party tortfeasor, he or she would be able to obtain jury interrogatories in which
he or she would be able to request the jury to categorize the various types of
damages, and separating those damages that represent workers’ compensation or
medical benefits and those that do not, thereby, protecting certain damages from
being subject to subrogation.76 If, on the other hand, a claimant decided to settle his
claim outside of court, the entire amount of settlement or compromise is subject to
the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee, and the claimant is precluded
under section 4123.931(D) from showing that certain portions of the settlement or
compromise do not represent or duplicate benefits and compensation paid out by the
Bureau or a self-insured employer.77 Therefore, Ohio’s subrogation statute

70

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119-20.

71

Id. at 1119.

72

Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, supra note 69.

73

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121.

74

See generally Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121-23.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 1121. See also Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

77

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121. See also Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.
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impermissibly and unconstitu-tionally discriminated between claimants who settled
third party tort actions and those who tried their cases to a jury.78
Additionally, Justice Resnick noted that often times the actual combined amount
of the workers’ compensation benefits and settlement recovery is insufficient to
cover all of a claimant’s loss, and “[i]t can hardly be said that a double recovery
results when a tort victim is allowed to retain two recoveries that, when combined,
still do not make him or her whole.”79 The court decided that the settlement problem
in section 4123.931(D) amounted to an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due
process, and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Article I, § 2, as it
distinguished between injured workers who go to trial and those who settle.80 The
Equal Protection violation is based on the settlement language of the statute, which
essentially presumes a double recovery occurs whenever a claimant retains workers’
compensation and tort damages, and “claimants who try their claims are permitted to
rebut this presumption while claimants who settle their tort claims are not.”81
E One Final Statement by the Supreme Court of Ohio
Mr. Holeton asserted five other grounds under which Ohio’s subrogation statute
should be held unconstitutional, all of which were summarily struck down by the
Supreme Court of Ohio.82 Importantly, the court stated, “[i]n so holding, we do not
accept the proposition that a workers’ compensation subrogation statute is per se
unconstitutional, and nothing in the opinion shall be construed to prevent the General
Assembly from ever enacting such a statute. We only hold that R.C. 4123.931, in its
present form, is unconstitutional.”83
After the Supreme Court of Ohio’s split decision in Holeton, three judges offered
a blistering dissent.84 Additionally, the Bureau promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration in an attempt to preserve the workers’ compensation subrogation
statute in Ohio.85 By examining and considering those various arguments and
competing views, this Note asserts that the majority in Holeton correctly ruled that
Ohio’s subrogation statute stands in violation of the Ohio Constitution.
IV. COMPETING VIEWS ON SUBROGATION RIGHTS IN OHIO: THE HOLETON
DISSENT AND THE BUREAU’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Due to the great importance of subrogation rights in the workers’ compensation
context, the Holeton decision stirred up a great deal of controversy in Ohio. The

78

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121-22.

79

Id. at 1122.

80

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

81

Communications Office of Ohio Supreme Court, Supreme Court Strikes Workers’
Compensation Subrogation Statute (June 27, 2001).
82

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129.

83

Id. at 1129.

84

See id (Moyer, J., dissenting)

85

See Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation, Holteon v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428).
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dissenting justices and the Bureau argued intensely against the majority’s decision,
perhaps predicting the onslaught of arguments that would arise regarding the refund
of subrogation monies following the majority’s decision. After an examination of
each specific argument from both sources, however, it becomes clear that the
majority’s decision in Holeton was correct, and the Supreme Court of Ohio was
justified in denying the Bureau’s Motion. This conclusion effectively allows the
injured workers of Ohio to continue on their path towards reimbursement.
A. The Dissent’s Arguments
The dissent’s first argument is based on “[t]he principle that courts are not the
creators of public policy and should not decide cases based on a disagreement with
[the] legislature . . . .”86 The dissenting justices in Holeton accused the majority of
overstepping its role and substituting themselves for the General Assembly of Ohio,
thereby, basing their decision on their own legislative policy preferences.87 In the
dissent, Justice Moyer stated, “[t]he majority’s determination . . . appears to derive
from its disagreement with the substance of legislation. The reasons stated for
declaring the statute unconstitutional are generally policy arguments, not principles
of constitutional law.”88
Second, the dissent saw no constitutional problem with letting the Bureau or a
self-insured employer collect estimated future costs as part of its subrogation claim
against an injured employee’s recovery.89 The dissent noted that no estimate is ever
going to be absolutely perfect, and even though future costs may sometimes be
overestimated, they are often underestimated.90 For example, the court stated that
although there were circumstances in which an employee may die before receiving
benefits equal to the amount of subrogation, there were also circumstances in which
an employee may live beyond their life expectancy.91 Justice Moyer added that in
determining future values, the court “hears evidence from both the claimant and the
subrogee, and may reject the subrogee’s projections if it finds them not well
supported . . . [c]ourts routinely estimate the value of future payments in these cases,
aided by expert testimony, mortality tables, and formulas for reducing future
payments to present value.”92
Third, the dissenting justices argued that no fundamental constitutional right of
an employee was violated because of the treatment of settlements differently than
judgments awarded after a trial.93 Justice Moyer supported this proposal by stating
“[i]f an employee is dissatisfied with settlement policies, the employee may proceed
with a jury trial . . . R.C. 4123.931 does not force employees to litigate . . . like all

86

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129.

87

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

88

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d. at 1129.

89

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

90

Holeton, 738 N.E.2d at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting); Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.

91

Holeton, 738 N.E.2d at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting).

92

Id. at 1130.

93

Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.
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claimants, injured employees are free to decide whether to proceed to trial or to
settle.”94
Finally, Justice Cook’s dissent stated that the majority’s decision stood “for the
bizarre and unsupportable proposition that a court may declare a statute
unconstitutional on its face simply because it may be applied unconstitutionally in
some cases.”95 Justice Cook believed that the majority’s decision to declare the
statute facially unconstitutional fell short of the difficult standard required for this
type of challenge; even though a statute may operate unconstitutionally in some
circumstances, that is not sufficient to render it completely void.96
As stated in the preceding arguments, the dissenting Justices in Holeton would
have upheld the subrogation statute’s constitutionality by attacking the majority’s
decision and the methodology employed to arrive at that decision. Additionally, the
Bureau promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration after the decision in Holeton.97
Discussed below are various arguments made by the Bureau that are similar to those
arguments made by the dissent in Holeton, but also unique in certain situations.
B. The Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration’s Arguments
First, the Bureau argued that section 4123.931 was rationally based because the
statute furthered a legitimate legislative objective.98 The Bureau felt that the
majority in Holeton simply declared Ohio’s subrogation statute unconstitutional
based upon two potential and hypothetical situations that may arise in a case where
subrogation rights are asserted.99 Furthermore, the Bureau argued that the majority
overlooked the fact that there are circumstances under which the subrogation statute
benefited the claimant, and fulfilled the legislature’s intent of preventing a double
recovery.100
Second, the Bureau argued that section 4123.931(D) did not violate equal
protection guarantees of claimants who settled their tort claims, but simply precluded
the parties from colluding to prevent subrogation.101 In the case of those claimants
94

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1131. Additionally, the dissent stated that “[e]ach process has its
own advantages and disadvantages, and the employee must decide whether to submit his or
her claim to a trial that would determine the portion of the award that should be shielded from
subrogation, or to settle with the tortfeasor, taking into consideration that the settlement
amount will be subject to subrogation.” Id. at 1131-32.
95

Id. at 1133 (Cook, J., dissenting).

96
Id. Additionally, Justice Cook felt that the majority needed to consider many more
additional situations before declaring the statute facially unconstitutional or invalid in toto;
simply finding the statute invalid in a few circumstances is not enough. Id. Justice Cook also
noted that the majority’s analysis fell short of this exhaustive standard. Id.
97

See supra note 85.

98

See Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
at 2, Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428).
99

See id. at 4.

100

See id.

101

See id. at 7 (“The provision that any settlement is presumed to represent amounts
subject to subrogation will not necessarily work to the detriment of the plaintiff, as the court
assumes . . . without such a provision, the subrogee’s interests are not protected.”).
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who go to trial, the statute allowed the jury to determine the amounts and types of
damages.102 In the case of settlement, the statute simply made it a practical necessity
to involve the subrogee in negotiations, thereby, allowing the subrogee to look after
his or her interests.103
One last notable argument from the Bureau involved the idea of severability.
The Bureau argued that even if portions of section 4123.931 were deemed
unconstitutional, the subrogation statute itself was not.104 Therefore, the Bureau
asserted that the few portions of the statute deemed unconstitutional should be
severed and the remaining portions should remain intact since that was the intent of
the legislature.105
The arguments presented by the dissenting justices and the Bureau demonstrate
the mixed emotions and conflicting ideas the Holeton decision created. Deep
examination of these preceding arguments, however, leads to the conclusion that the
majority’s decision in Holeton was correct. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio
correctly denied the Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby making Holeton
the law.
C. Examination of the Dissent’s Arguments
The dissenting justices began with the argument that the majority substituted
themselves for the General Assembly, making policy arguments instead of
constitutional law arguments.106 This argument is generally flawed, as the majority
took great pains to compare throughout the entire decision many facets of the
subrogation statute to the applicable areas of constitutional law.107 By examining
hypothetical situations that commonly arise in workers’ compensation situations, the
majority found clear violations of specific provisions of the Ohio Constitution.108
Additionally, in the last paragraph of the decision, the majority urged the General
Assembly to enact a subrogation statute that would be constitutionally sound.109 The
majority did not substitute itself for the General Assembly, but simply informed the
General Assembly that the present statute is unconstitutional and needs to be
revised.110 The majority made no recommendations, nor any policy arguments.
They simply stated how the present statute violated common law notions embedded
in the Ohio Constitution, actually leaving the rest up to the actual General Assembly.
The dissenting justices went on to argue that no future estimate is perfect, and
although estimates may sometimes be overestimated, they are often
102

See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 9, Holeton (No. 00-428).

103

Id. Such a provision is not unconstitutional, but serves the legitimate governmental
interest of promoting a full and equitable resolution of a subrogation claim. Id.
104

See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 10, Holeton (No. 00-428).

105

See id.

106

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129-30.

107

See generally, Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119-24.

108

Id.

109

See id. at 1129.

110

Id.
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underestimated.111 The dissent failed, however, to see the magnitude of its reasoning
because a constitutional violation will always occur when future values of
compensation and benefits are overestimated, thus resulting in a windfall for the
subrogee.112 Simply stating that underestimations occur does not relieve the notion
that overestimations often result in constitutional violations. Therefore, the resulting
windfall to the statutory subrogee in these circumstances needs to be eliminated.
Since no estimate formulated by a court is going to be perfect, a new statute that
implements new methods is needed to prevent a statutory subrogee from collecting
in situations where an obvious unconstitutional taking has occurred.
The dissenting justices also stated that a claimant is not forced to settle because
he or she always has the chance to litigate and therefore take full advantage of jury
interrogatories to categorize damages.113 An effective counter-argument to this
proposition, however, is that it is not true that every claimant has the money, means,
or time to litigate their respective claims. It is naïve to believe that all claimants
have the unfettered opportunity to try their claims. By discriminating between those
claimants who do and those who do not try their claims, a clear violation of equal
protection rights takes place. Additionally, the majority points out that trying a case
to have damages designated does not obviate the potential problems in these types of
situations.114 The fact that a claimant has the legal ability to try their case does not
mean they will have the means to do so. Moreover, it does not mean a double
recovery will not still occur in the process.
The final argument made by Justice Cook is perhaps the most persuasive of the
dissent’s arguments. Justice Cook believed that although a statute may operate
unconstitutionally in some circumstances, it is insufficient to render the statute
completely void on its face.115 Although the majority considered only a few
instances where the statute operated unconstitutionally, they explained that situations
and circumstances like those mentioned in the opinion happen frequently in the
workers’ compensation context, and it is the subrogation statute that creates those
situations by virtue of its classifications and presumptions.116 The majority
considered the repeated and familiar circumstances that often arise between the
common law and the subrogation statute to determine that the statute was not related
to its presumed goal of preventing double recoveries.117 It is impossible for a court
to consider every possible circumstance that may arise with respect to the
subrogation statute. Therefore, in considering a few of the most often occurring
situations, the majority demonstrated that the subrogation statute worked
111

Id. at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting).

112

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119.

113

Id. at 1131 (Moyer, J., dissenting).

114

Id. at 1124 (“Despite any allocation of damages, the claimant’s tort recovery is still
fixed by the insurance policy limits, the combined amount of those limits and workers’
compensation is still insufficient to cover the claimant’s actual total loss, and there is still no
double recovery to justify a right of subrogation to any of the insurance proceeds.”).
115

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1133 (Cook, J., dissenting).

116

Id. at 1125.

117

Id.
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unconstitutionally.118 Although the statute is appropriate in some situations,
important sections of the statute work directly against the Ohio Constitution.119
Therefore, the majority correctly held that Ohio’s workers’ compensation
subrogation statute violates the Ohio Constitution.
The arguments in response to the majority’s decision in Holeton continued when
the Bureau set forth a few more arguments in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Unfortunately, these arguments found little merit with the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Consequently, the court denied the motion. Through an examination of the Bureau’s
three main arguments, the flaws become quite apparent.
D. Examination of the Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration
The Bureau agreed with the dissent and believed that the majority overlooked the
fact that there are circumstances under which the subrogation statute works to the
benefit of the claimant and fulfills the legislature’s intent of preventing a double
recovery; thus, the Bureau argues the statute has a rational basis.120 The statute’s
operation, however, does not aid the government’s interest in preventing double
recoveries, because, in attempting to achieve that goal, constitutional violations
occur quite regularly in numerous claims.121 As mentioned previously, just because
the statute works in some circumstances does not mean that it should deduct monies
from claimants and produce a windfall for subrogees in other circumstances.122 The
subrogation statute is both arbitrary and irrational in a wide variety of circumstances.
The Bureau’s Motion also claimed that section 4123.931(D) did not violate equal
protection guarantees of claimants who settled their tort claims, but simply precluded
the parties from colluding to prevent subrogation.123 The majority’s arguments
regarding settlements and judgments under the statute, however, make it clear that
section 4123.931 created a level of discrimination between claimants.124 When the
Bureau stated that section 4123.931(D) simply worked to keep parties from
colluding to prevent subrogation, they only examined the tip of the iceberg. As
previously examined, section 4123.931(D) worked unconstitutionally in many ways
and cannot be viewed with such simplicity.
Lastly, the Bureau asserted that the court deemed two specific phrases, but not
the entire statute, in section 4123.931 unconstitutional. Therefore, the entire statute
should not have been declared unconstitutional, and only the unconstitutional
portions should have been severed.125 This argument initially fails because the
Bureau did not previously raise the issue of severability, and they should not be

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4, Holeton (No. 00-428).

121

Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1125.

122

Id.

123

See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 7, Holeton (No. 00-428).

124

See supra text accompanying note 114.

125

See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 10, Holeton (No. 00-428).
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permitted to raise this issue at so late a juncture.126 Moreover, Holeton argued that
the subrogation statute “represents a highly integrated, comprehensive treatment of
subrogation rights . . . [i]t is simply not possible to sever [a provision] . . . and still
remain true to the legislative intent.”127 This argument, therefore, lacks merit and
can be dismissed.
Although the holding of Holeton is correct, issues still surround the state of
subrogation in Ohio. Because the 1995 statute has been effectively ruled
unconstitutional, the Bureau and self-insured employers no longer enjoy subrogation
rights under Ohio’s statutory scheme. However, one of the many post-Holeton
arguments revolves around whether the 1993 subrogation statute is now revived with
the fall of the 1995 statute. This argument is fully examined in the following section.
V. IN THE AFTERMATH OF HOLETON: IS THE FORMER SUBROGATION
STATUTE REVIVED?
Directly following the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton, questions
began forming as to what subrogation rights, if any, the Bureau now possessed. One
of the strongest arguments focused on the revival of the 1993 subrogation statute,
which would effectively give the Bureau all subrogation powers it retained under the
old statute.128 Although the general view is that the 1993 subrogation statute is not
revived, the Bureau has not taken a position on it. This section asserts that for
various constitutional, statutory, and legislative intent-driven reasons, the 1993
statute should not be revived. Moreover, if the statute was ever revived, it should
fail for the same constitutional reasons that led to the demise of the 1995 statute.
Therefore, since the Bureau cannot assert any subrogation powers under this line of
argument, the injured workers of Ohio have an increasingly better chance at having
the millions of dollars unconstitutionally taken by the state finally returned to them.
A. The Argument for Revival of the 1993 Subrogation Statute
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to rule the 1995 subrogation statute
unconstitutional has major implications as to whether the 1993 statute should be in
effect. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained the consequences and impact of
ruling a statute unconstitutional, stating that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”129
Since section 4123.931 is to be treated as a legal nullity, “the ruling of Holeton is to
be applied retroactively and the statute must be viewed as never having any force or
126
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, at 4-5,
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428).
127

Id. “[S]ince the statute defines BWC’s subrogation interest in an omnibus fashion that
includes both past and future wages and medical benefits, the provision dealing with
subrogation of future benefits is entirely essential to (and inseparable from) the balance of the
statute.” Id.
128

Telephone Interview with Suzanne Stocker, Esq. (Dec.-Jan. 2001-02) (hereinafter
Stocker).
129
Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 9 (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished) (citing Middleton v.
Ferguson, 25 Ohio St. 3d 71, 80 (1986)).
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effect.”130 Therefore, the 1995 subrogation statute should be viewed as if it never
existed, leaving the possibility that the 1993 subrogation statute is revived.
The strongest argument for revival of the 1993 statute is based upon the notion
that when the 1995 statute was ruled unconstitutional and invalid, the provisions that
repealed the 1993 statute were also made invalid, therefore, reviving the 1993
statute.131 In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Sullivan, 132
the court held that
[W]hen a court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional, and the
offending statute replaced an existing law that had been repealed in the
same bill that enacted the offending statute, the repeal is also invalid
unless it clearly appears that the General Assembly meant the repeal to
have effect even if the offending statute had never been passed.133
The argument here is that the enactment of the offending statute via House Bill 278,
section 4123.931, replaced an existing law, the former section 4123.93, which was
repealed in that same bill. Therefore, under the court’s logic in Sullivan, the repeal
of the former section 4123.93 also became invalid when the court ruled section
4123.931 unconstitutional. This rationale leaves the former 1993 subrogation statute
in full effect.
Although they are not taking a firm position on the matter, the Bureau and selfinsured employers can use this case law to argue that the Holeton decision revived
the 1993 statute, and that version of the statute is now in full force.134 There are,
however, many arguments that support the proposition that the 1993 statute cannot
be revived. These arguments, along with the unconstitutionality of the 1993 statute,
make it apparent that the 1993 subrogation statute should not be revived.
B. The Constitutional Argument Against Revival
The basis for a major argument against the possible revival of the 1993
subrogation statute lies in the Ohio Constitution. Article II, § 15(D) of the Ohio
Constitution states that “[n]o law shall be revived or amended unless the new act
contains the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended, and the section or
sections amended shall be repealed.”135 This provision of the Constitution arose as
early as 1917, in State, ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien.136 In that decision, the Supreme
Court of Ohio noted that this provision of the Ohio Constitution is mandatory, stating
that “it is clear that this provision of the Constitution, requiring each new act to
contain the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended, is mandatory;
130

Bashein, supra note 19, at 8 (citing Peerless Electric Co. vs. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467,
468 (1955)).
131

Bashein, supra note 19, at 10.

132

739 N.E.2d 788, 794 (Ohio 2001).

133

Id. at 794; see also Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467 (Ohio 1955); Pogue v.
Groom, 109 N.E. 477 (Ohio 1914).
134

Bashein, supra note 19, at 10.

135

Id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D)).

136

115 N.E. 25 (Ohio 1917).
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otherwise repealed sections must be given the same force and effect as if they were
not in fact appealed.”137 The court further mentioned that if reference may be made
to statutes expressly repealed by the legislature, reference could be made to a statute
that was repealed half a century ago.138 Not only is this extremely impractical, but it
is expressly prevented by this provision of the Ohio Constitution.139
More recently, in State, ex rel. Judy v. Wandstrat,140 the Court of Appeals for the
First District of Ohio held that when a statute that effectively repealed earlier
enactments was found to be unconstitutional, that determination would not operate to
revive earlier enactments, due to the provision of Article II, § 15(D) of the Ohio
Constitution.141 Therefore, in order to revive the 1993 subrogation statute, the
General Assembly must pass a new act that contains the relevant portions of the
former 1993 subrogation statute.142 The case law in tune with State v. Sullivan,
which supports revival of the 1993 statute, fails to address this important and
mandatory Constitutional provision that effectively bars revival.143
In addition to this Constitutional provision that prevents revival, an argument
may be made as to what the intent of the legislature was when they enacted House
Bill 278 and, specifically, section 4123.931. The Bureau and self-insured employers
may argue that the General Assembly definitely intended to have a subrogation
statute in place, but through an examination of the language contained in House Bill
278, the legislature’s true intent becomes apparent.
C. The General Assembly’s Intent
By examining section 10 of House Bill 278, it becomes apparent that the General
Assembly did not attend the 1993 statute to be revived as a consequence of the 1995
statute being held unconstitutional.144 In section 10 of House Bill 278 the General
Assembly stated that “[t]he sections of this act, and every part of such sections, are
hereby declared to be independent sections and parts of sections, and the holding of
any section or part thereof to be void and ineffective shall not effect any other
section or parts of sections.”145 This supports the rationale that just because the court
ruled section 4123.931 unconstitutional and void does not mean that the repeal

137
Id. at 28. Accordingly, the court states that “[t]he repeal of a statute is the end of that
statute. To all extents and purposes it is the same as if it never existed.” Id.; see also Bashein,
supra note 19, at 10.
138

State, ex rel. Godfrey, 115 N.E. at 28.

139

Id.

140

577 N.E.2d 364 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist 1989).

141

Id. at 366. “The passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 390 effectively repealed these earlier
enactments, and a determination by this court that Am.Sub.H.B. was unconstitutional would
not operate to revive them.” Id.; see also Bashein, supra note 19, at 10-11.
142

Bashein, supra note 19, at 11.

143

Id. at 10.

144

See id. at 12.

145

Id. (citing section 10 of House Bill 278).
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provisions of the House Bill 278146 may also be considered void. The express intent
of the legislature is that the repeal provisions should be left alone, even if certain
parts of the Bill are held unconstitutional.147
Moreover, as stated previously in Sullivan, a repeal will be considered invalid
unless it is clear that the General Assembly meant the repeal to persist even if the
offending statute had never been passed.148 The General Assembly’s directions in
section 10 of House Bill 278 clearly show that the Assembly intended the repeal
provisions to remain unharmed, and thereby prevent the 1993 subrogation statute
from ever being revived.149
It is apparent that the 1993 statute cannot be revived while staying true to Ohio
Constitutional Law and the General Assembly’s express intent. Additionally,
because the 1993 subrogation statute was so worthless and ineffective, the General
Assembly had to enact a broader, more productive statute in 1995. Therefore, it may
be argued that the General Assembly could never have intended the 1993 statute to
be revived, as it is inherently weaker than its successor.150 With that in mind, it can
be concluded that the 1993 subrogation statute should be considered unconstitutional
for the same reasons as the 1995 statute.
D. The Unconstitutionality of the 1993 Subrogation Statute
If the 1993 statute were revived, a challenge to its relevant sections under the
Ohio Constitution would be the most effective method at proving the statute’s
invalidity.151 As discussed in previous sections, the 1993 subrogation statute was
intended to preclude double recoveries, but in actuality it accomplished even less
than the 1995 statute.152 For example, the Bureau or a self insured employer had no
subrogation rights in any of the following instances: out of court settlements,
recoveries from the employee’s own motorist insurance policy, wrongful death
actions, or when the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and court costs exceeded
the workers’ compensation benefits paid.153 Therefore, like the 1995 subrogation
statute, the 1993 statute “indiscriminately required subrogation claims to be paid in
only limited instances and without regard to the actual amount of any ‘double
recovery’ received by the injured worker.”154 This type of action amounts to

146
Section 2 contains the provision that effectively repealed the former subrogation statute,
§ 4123.93.
147

See Bashein, supra note 19, at 11.

148

Sullivan, 739 N.E.2d at 794.

149

See H.R. 278, 310 124th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).

150

Bashein, supra note 19, at 14. “[T]he readily apparent loopholes, incongruities, and
uncertainties created by H.B. 107 prompted the passage of H.B. 278. In many respects, the
earlier legislation is even more unfair and inequitable than the General Assembly’s latest
effort to create subrogation rights in Ohio.” Id.
151

Bashein, supra note 19, at 15.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 15-16.

154

Id. at 16.
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prohibited taking, which is against the constitutional ideals of private property due
process.155
In ruling the 1995 statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Ohio found
serious equal protection problems in the 1995 statute’s differing treatment of
claimants who decide to settle their claims and those who try their claims in court.156
Similarly, by discriminating between claimants in the different instances mentioned
above, the 1993 subrogation statute violated a claimant’s equal protection rights in
an intensified offensive manner.157 This statute cannot satisfy the high equal
protection standards that the Holeton decision promoted.158 When the 1993 statute is
held to the analysis of Holeton, it becomes apparent that this statute is inherently
flawed and it should not be revived.159
The Holeton decision effectively gutted Ohio’s subrogation statute of any type of
subrogation power, leaving only worthless definitions.160 Additionally, as a result of
the preceding arguments, it is readily apparent that the 1993 statute should remain
repealed indefinitely.161 Therefore, Ohio is currently in a position similar to what it
was in before subrogation rights existed in Ohio.162 However, the difference lies in
the fact that the Bureau and self-insured employers have been unjustifiably collecting
subrogation funds from claimants for several years under a subrogation statute that
has been held to be unconstitutional and is therefore non-existent.163 Under this
premise, it seems proper that the Bureau should be forced to refund all funds
improperly taken under an unconstitutional subrogation statute.
VI. THE FINAL STEPS: REFUND OF SUBROGATION PAYMENTS AND
A NEW SUBROGATION STATUTE
The Bureau and self-insured employers enjoyed the luxury of collecting over
fifty million dollars from the injured workers of Ohio since 1995.164 These monies
were taken regardless of whether a double recovery actually occurred and in
apparent confliction with the Ohio Constitution. Now they’re being unjustly
retained. The Bureau should be required to repay these monies that were
unconstitutionally taken. Only then can the state of Ohio move into the future and
create a new subrogation statute that is both fair to the injured worker and keeps the
subrogation rights of the Bureau in mind.
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Id.

156

Bashein, supra note 19, at 16. See also, Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1130.
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See Bashein, supra note 19, at 17.
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Id.
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Id.
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Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 4 (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished).
161

See supra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D.
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Bashein, supra note 19, at 13.
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This section begins with an introduction as to the Bureau’s position on refunding
subrogation payments, and the main argument that is being asserted in a pending
class action lawsuit dealing with the matter, Santos v. Bureau of Workers
Compensation.165 This section asserts that the court of common pleas is the correct
court to grant this type of equitable relief, and specific cases will be examined that
provide the remedy sought in this class action.166 Moreover, this section asserts that
a total refund of subrogated funds is appropriate under an equitable principle of
restitution.167 This section concludes with a discussion as to the creation of a new
subrogation statute in Ohio.168
A. The Bureau’s Position on Refund of Subrogation Payments
Although the Bureau has collected approximately fifty million dollars from
injured Ohio citizens based upon an unconstitutional subrogation statute, the Bureau
has made no move to refund any of the money.169 Moreover, even in light of the
Holeton decision, the Bureau has not stated that it will cease and desist all
subrogation activities throughout the state of Ohio in all circumstances.170
Additionally, the Bureau did not indicate it would refund the monies it had
unlawfully taken from injured workers through application of an unconstitutional
subrogation statute.171
B. The Class Action Lawsuit
This firm position maintained by the Bureau is currently being attacked in a class
action lawsuit, Santos v. Bureau of Workers Compensation, pending in the Eighth
District Court of Appeals.172 The attorneys for the class 173 are arguing that the state
of Ohio should be enjoined from asserting any subrogation rights under the now
unconstitutional statute.174 Additionally, the Bureau should be responsible for

165

See infra text accompanying note 169-72.
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See infra Section VI.B.
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See infra Section VI.C.

168

See infra Section VI.D.
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Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, Angel L. Santos, et al., at 1,9, Santos v. Bureau of
Workers’ Comp. (Ohio Ct. App. filed July 13, 2001) (No. 80353).
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Id. at 2.
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Id.
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No. 80535 (Ohio Ct. App. filed July 13, 2001). This class action lawsuit is being
brought by Craig Bashein and Paul Flowers (among others), whose unpublished seminar
materials provided a great deal of information used to construct this Note.
173

The protected classes are “[a]ll workers who have established, or are in the process of
establishing, intentional tort claims against their employers where subrogation rights have
been or are being asserted under R.C. 4123.931 with respect to any civil recovery secured
from the tortfeasor” and “[a]ll workers who are or have been subject to subrogation claims,
other than those based on intentional tort claims, asserted by authority of R.C. 4123.931.”
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, Angel L. Santos, et al., at 3, Santos (No. 80353).
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Bashein, supra note 19, at 19.
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refunding all payments received as a result of the improper application of the section
4123.931.175
Therefore, a decision was made in the Santos class action lawsuit to file in the
court of common pleas. To undertand why suit was filed in the court of common
pleas, it is extremely important to clarify that the class action complaint contains no
request for monetary damages against the Bureau.176 The complaint asserts “the
government is obtaining these monies unlawfully pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute, and seeks an equitable order requiring the government to disgorge the money
it obtained . . . such a case is not a claim for legal damages, but for equitable
relief.”177 The Plaintiffs in this class action correctly argue that the court of common
pleas has the authority to issue equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief against
state agencies.178 This conclusion becomes valid by examining Ohio Revised Code
section 2743.039(A)(2)179 and judicial decisions which offer guidance, and more
importantly, precedence.
This position that the court of common pleas has the authority to issue equitable,
injunctive, and declaratory relief against state agencies is strengthened in recent Ohio
Court of Appeals decision.180 In Judy, the court of appeals held that claims for
injunctive relief and simple reimbursement of improperly assessed fees against the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles are not money damages.181 Additionally, the court ruled
that the claims were within the exception provided for in Ohio Revised Code section
2743.03(A)(2), and that the court of common pleas had the authority to hear the
case.182 This type of injunctive and equitable relief in the form of simple
reimbursement was the appropriate remedy in this decision.183 Moreover, it is
apparent that Ohio courts have often ruled for plaintiffs in equitable, injunctive, and
declaratory relief claims against state agencies, usually resulting in a refund of
monies impermissibly taken by that agency.184 The following two cases not only
175

Id.

176

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees (No. 80353).

177

Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court in Ohio Hosp. Assn. noted that “[t]he
reimbursement of monies withheld pursuant to an invalid administrative rule is equitable
relief, not money damages, and is consequently not barred by sovereign immunity [because
the State has previously consented to be sued on such matters]” Id. (citing Ohio Hosp. Assn.
v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services, 579 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1991)).
178

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, at 8, Santos (No. 80353)

179

This provision of the Revised Code allows another Court of original jurisdiction (other
than the Court of Claims) to hear and determine a civil action in which the sole relief that the
claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable
relief. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.039(A)(2) (Anderson 2001).
180
Judy v. State of Ohio, No. L-01-1200, 2001 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 5978 at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 6th Dist. Dec. 31, 2001), cert. granted, Judy v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 769
N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 2002).
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supplement the ideas laid out above, but also show that in this specific circumstance,
refund of subrogation payments is a plausible and correct measure to take.
In Ohio Hospital Ass’n v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Services,185 several hospitals
sought an injunction and monetary relief from the Ohio Department of Human
Services stemming from Human Services’ adoption of an administrative rule
reducing Medicaid reimbursements, which the court ruled violated Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.186 The Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the claim for
reimbursement of monies was one for equitable relief rather than money damages,
explaining that damages are given to a plaintiff to substitute for a loss, whereas
equitable relief is given to give a plaintiff that which he is entitled to.187 Therefore,
the court held that Human Services was not immune from money damages, and
awarded relief in this circumstance.188
Likewise, in Henley Health Care v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp.,189 a health
care provider brought action against the Bureau for monetary relief stemming from
the Bureau’s withholding of payments due to the provider for supplies given to
workers’ compensation claimants.190 The Bureau withheld the payments because the
provider allegedly broke certain rules.191 Those rules were later found to be invalid
because they were properly promulgated under Chapter 119 of the Revised Code.192
The court noted that the claims were truly equitable in nature, and the common pleas
court would have jurisdiction.193 Therefore, the provider was permitted to seek
reimbursement because they were entitled to the funds that were being withheld.194
Like the plaintiffs in the preceding cases, injured workers in Ohio have had funds
taken from them under a statute that has been decisively ruled unconstitutional by the
highest court in the state. The ruling in Holeton has made it perfectly clear that the
Bureau has taken that which it had absolutely no right to take.195 Therefore, in light
of statutory law and specific cases discussed above, the injured workers of Ohio are
entitled to the over fifty million dollars that is owed to them. The class action
lawsuit should succeed for the reasons stated above, but more importantly, the
injured workers of Ohio are entitled to refund of their money under an equitable
theory of restitution.196
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579 N.E.2d 695, 695 (Ohio 1991).
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Id. at 695.
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Id. at 700.
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Id. at 701.
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No. 94APE08-1216, 1995 WL 92101 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Feb. 23, 1995).
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Id.
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Id. at *2.
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Henley, Health Care, 1995 WL 92101 at *4.

195

See generally Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1111.
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C. An Equitable Theory of Restitution
Injunctive and equitable relief in the form of reimbursement is an appropriate
remedy under the equitable theory of restitution.197 Therefore, under this common
law principle, the injured workers of Ohio have a solid argument for refund of their
money. In current law, a principle of restitution is closely associated with the idea
that one ought to pay for a benefit that is unjustly retained.198 As noted by the Ohio
Eighth District Court of Appeals in, “[r]estitution is an equitable remedy used to
make an injured party whole. At the core of the law of restitution is the principle
that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other . . . .”199 Therefore, it follows that if a government
agency withholds funds that it was never entitled to, the agency is unjustly enriched
and the common law demands restitution. It is quite apparent here that the Bureau
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the injured workers of Ohio.200
In the circumstance at hand, the Bureau refuses to refund all subrogation funds it
has collected under the authority of an unconstitutional statute. A principle of
restitution requires that these injured workers be made whole, and this entails a full
refund of the millions of dollars impermissibly and unfairly taken from them by the
Bureau.201 It is perfectly clear that restitution is an appropriate and necessary action
in this case, and until the refund of all subrogated monies occurs, the state of Ohio is
still allowing an unconstitutional statute to hold some remnants of power.
D. Formulating a New Subrogation Statute
Ohio has never had the benefit of a strong subrogation statute that prevents
double recoveries and protects the rights of the injured worker and the statutory
subrogee. The subrogation statutes failed because there was not a fair balance of
power between the parties, and the methodology that the statutes employed was
flawed in many instances. In creating a new statute, Ohio needs to examine
alternative methods to achieving the goal of subrogation. This can be done by
examining the offensive portions of the 1995 statute, and looking to other state
subrogation statutes for guidance.
The Holeton decision and its various implications effectively left Ohio as the
only state without a valid subrogation statute.202 The Ohio General Assembly,
however, has begun work on a new subrogation statute that should surface sometime
in the upcoming year.203 In an interesting and surprising move, the General
Assembly has enlisted the help of both the Bureau and various plaintiff attorneys in

197
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KASTELY, ET AL. CONTRACTING LAW, 93 (2nd ed. 2000).
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Bashein, supra note 19, at 20 (citing Colangelo v. Cahelmara, No. 57581, 1990 W.L.
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Stephen S. Mazzei, How will the Legislature Respond? Subrogation Around the
Country, at 1 (August 9, 2001) (unpublished).
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order to formulate a workable statute that is fair to both sides, and presents few
complications and little conflict between parties. In mounting the difficult task of
making Ohio’s new subrogation statute work effectively, it is important that the
General Assembly begin by looking to other state subrogation statutes for statutory
guidance. In actuality, they need look no further than Pennsylvania for a subrogation
model that works well and poses no threat to the injured worker’s constitutional
rights. The Pennsylvania subrogation statute is examined below, in light of the
unconstitutional provisions that doomed the 1995 statute.
The “estimated future values of compensation” provision in Ohio’s subrogation
allowed the Bureau to collect additional monies from the injured workers’ settlement
or judgment based on a estimate of what the Bureau would probably have to pay the
injured worker in the future benefits.204 This provision caused great controversy, and
was eventually deemed unconstitutional due to the many circumstances where the
Bureau would take more than it was actually entitled to.205 Although Ohio’s method
of providing the Bureau with future compensation was deemed unconstitutional, the
majority of state subrogation statutes do allow an employer to sustain a valid
subrogation claim for the actuarial future of additional compensation and benefits.206
Only a minority of states limit subrogation claims to the actual amounts paid,
without taking estimated future values of compensation into consideration.207
Therefore, the General Assembly cannot simply ignore the statutory subrogee’s right
to future values of compensation while creating the new statute. Future values of
compensation need to be included in Ohio’s subrogation statute in a way that is fully
constitutional (i.e., not amounting to a taking in any given situation). This can be
accomplished by creating an appropriate methodology, which all relative parties can
agree on, to which future interests may be decided.208 One such method that could
easily work to solve the problem of estimated future values in Ohio is embedded in
Pennsylvania’s statutory subrogation scheme.209
Section 319 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act210 states that “[a]ny
recovery against such third person in excess of the compensation theretofore paid by
the employer shall be paid forthwith to the employee . . . and shall be treated as an
advance payment by the employer on account of any future installments of
compensation.”211 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania elaborated on this provision
of the subrogation statute in P&R Welding & Fabricating v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeal Bd.212

204
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In P&R Welding, the court explained that a gross method should be used when
determining an employer’s subrogation rights and liabilities in a third-party
settlement.213 Under this method, “any balance of recovery [the amount available for
future credits] is determined by deducting the employer’s accrued lien [monies
which the employer has paid out in benefits to the injured worker] from the total
recovery.”214 Then, “[t]he balance of recovery is . . . divided by the weekly
compensation rate being paid to the workers’ compensation claimant in order to
arrive at what is known as a ‘grace period.’”215 The grace period is simply the actual
number of weeks in the future for which the employer does not have to pay
claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits.216 Basically, whatever the claimant
recovers in excess of what is owed to the employer goes directly to the future
workers’ compensation benefits that the claimant is entitled to receive, by way of a
“credit system.” This somewhat confusing method can be simply illustrated by the
facts in P&G Welding. The claimant recovered $165,000 from the third-party
tortfeasor.217 The money owed to the subrogee, or the “accrued lien,” totaled
$117,167.25.218 The difference, or “balance of recovery” is, therefore, $47,832.74.219
This balance is divided by the weekly compensation rate, and the grace period comes
out to 142 weeks.220 The Bureau does not have to pay the claimant for 142 weeks,
due to the $42,832.74 obtained in settlement with the third-party.221
This subrogation method prevents a double recovery by the claimant, makes the
statutory subrogee whole, and achieves the notion of “future compensation” without
ever having to calculate an estimate. Therefore, if this “credit” method was
implemented in Ohio, there would be no chance of a prohibited taking occurring, and
the statute might actually fly under the “constitutional radar.” In the Pennsylvania
statute’s simplicity, the purpose of subrogation is accomplished, and each party
benefits equally. Likewise, this statute provides insight as to the problem Holeton
found in discriminating between settlements and judgments.

213
Id. at 565; see also Darr Construction Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board,
715 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998).
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P&R Welding, 701 A.2d at 563.
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Ohio’s subrogation statute also treated claimants who settled their claims
differently from those who tried their claims.222 Interestingly, every other state’s
subrogation statutes treat agreed upon settlements exactly the same as court
judgments.223 Therefore, it is important that the language of Ohio’s new statute
allow for relevant damages to be characterized in both settlements and judgments.224
Under Pennsylvania’s subrogation statute, there is no provision that may be
construed as creating a difference between settlements and judgments.225
Pennsylvania recognizes that a statutory subrogee cannot touch damages which stem
from pain and suffering or loss of consortium, and compensation for these damages
may be negotiated through settlement procedures in lieu of trial.226 In either
circumstance, damages are always classified to see which represent monies paid
pursuant to a workers’ compensation program and those that do not.
In this context, the biggest fear that the Bureau has is that they will be excluded
from settlement proceedings, and therefore be unable to understand how damages
were classified. To remedy this situation, it is important that Ohio’s new statute
require both the employee’s and the subrogee’s signature on a settlement agreement,
consider settlements made without the subrogee’s knowledge void, and permit the
employee and subrogee to agree to terms other than those expressly provided in the
statute.227 With these provisions intact, settlements and judgments may be treated the
same, damages will always be classified, and the injured worker’s constitutional due
process rights will not be violated.
Solving the major problems inherent in the 1995 subrogation statute will be the
first steps for the General Assembly, in addition to making sure that each aspect of a
new subrogation statute is constitutionally sound. With subrogation statutes like
Pennsylvania’s in mind, a new and stronger method for achieving the purpose of
subrogation can be implemented. As advocates from all respective parties work on a
new statute, it is hopeful that Ohio’s new subrogation statute remains a statutory
staple for years to come. With a new statute, the tumultuous history of workers’
compensation subrogation in Ohio may give rise to a new era.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state of subrogation rights in Ohio has been on thin ice from the very
beginning. The early absence of an Ohio statute that would effectively subrogate the
employer to the employee’s claim against a third party created confusion and
222
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1998). However, the Court also noted that “[w]e recognize that a potential for abuse exists in
the structuring of loss of consortium settlements between a claimant and a third party
tortfeasor due to the lack of participation by the employer in the proceeding. Fear of abuse,
however, is an impermissible basis upon which to require the forfeiture of a spouse’s valid
recovery. In the event a settlement is unreasonably apportioned, an employer may always
seek recourse in the court of common pleas.” Id. at 1081.
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disruption between the courts.228 Moreover, the 1993 subrogation statute was simply
a worthless disaster, as it indiscriminately required subrogation claims to be paid in
only limited instances and without regard to the actual amount of any double
recovery received by the injured worker. 229
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton effectively perpetuated the
many hardships that have plagued the history of workers’ compensation subrogation
in the state of Ohio. However, in disrupting the state of subrogation, the court
correctly determined that the 1995 statute violated the constitutional rights of injured
workers in Ohio. Additionally, this decision opened the doors for the refund of all
subrogation monies collected by the Bureau since 1995. It is important to note that
all subrogation payments by the injured workers of Ohio were non-voluntary. The
claimants had no choice but to comply with Ohio’s subrogation statute, even if it was
clear that they were not receiving a double recovery. This injustice needs to be
remedied by the Ohio courts.
Very simply, the injured workers of Ohio deserve to have that which was
unconstitutionally taken from them returned, and both the basic principles of
restitution and case law demand such a remedy.230 If the Ohio courts fail to refund
these monies, the Bureau will be unjustly enriched, and that is inherently unfair.
Before the state of Ohio moves on and develops a more productive and
constitutionally sound statute, it is important that the court correct the mistakes the
past subrogation statutes have created. The troubles caused by the subrogation
statutes cannot be quelled until the injured workers of Ohio are repaid. Once that is
done, the General Assembly can justifiably continue creating a new statute, and the
state of Ohio can finally put the troublesome workers’ compensation subrogation
statutes of the past behind them.
VIII. EPILOGUE
As promised by the Ohio General Assembly, a new subrogation statute has
surfaced since this Note was completed. Signed into power on January 8, 2003,
Senate Bill 227 effectively repealed the existing Ohio Revised Code Sections
4123.93 and 4123.931 and implemented a new and improved subrogation statue,
4123.931.231 The new subrogation statute has eliminated the unconstitutional
provisions of the former subrogation statute and created a new formula aimed at
achieving a fair and equitable result for both the claimant and statutory subrogee.232
Under a careful analysis of the new 4123.931, it appears that the Ohio General
Assembly has rectified the major problems inherent in the 1995 statute.
Additionally, the new formula seems to be a more specific, stronger and balanced
method for achieving the purposes of subrogation. Time will tell if Ohio’s new
subrogation statute passes constitutional muster and puts an end to the troublesome
history of workers’ compensation subrogation in Ohio.
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Additionally, on June 6, 2002, the Eighth District Court of Appeals came down
with its decision in Santos v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.233 The Court
ultimately held that “there is a presumption that a claim against the state should be
filed [exclusively’ in the Court of Claims,” and thereafter found that the complaint
(which sought the return of money subrogated under an unconstitutional statute) is a
civil action at law which should be lodged in the Court of Claims.”234 On November
20, 2002, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the appeal for review.235 Again, time
will tell if the injured workers of Ohio are finally returned the fifty million dollars
owed to them by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
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